Stop pasting passwords into chat — send a link instead

Every password you have ever sent over WhatsApp, Slack or email is still sitting there, in readable words, in somebody's message history and somebody's cloud backup. One-Time Secret encrypts the text in your browser and hides it inside the link itself, so what stays behind in the chat is an unreadable string. There is no server anywhere in this.

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The problem

Sharing a secret is an everyday chore. The Wi-Fi code for a guest, the admin login for a contractor, an API key for a colleague, your bank details for a refund. So you type it into a chat, and that is where it stays: searchable, backed up, synced to a laptop you do not control, visible to anyone who later picks up an unlocked phone. Most people know this is wrong and do it anyway, because the alternatives ask too much — a password manager the other person does not have, an encrypted app they will not install, or a “secure” website you have to trust with the very thing you are trying to protect.

How One-Time Secret works

• Type the secret. It is encrypted in your browser with AES-256-GCM before anything else happens.
• Choose how careful to be: a passphrase (on by default) that you tell them another way, and when this page should hide it — once it is opened, or after a set time.
• Send the link. They open it and copy what they need. Need a password from someone else instead? Use Ask: they send you back a link only your device can open. Opening is always free, with no account.

What you get

• Ask for a secret, with no serverSend a request link; the answer comes back as a link sealed with a key that lives only in your browser. Delete the request and every copy of the reply becomes unreadable — a real burn, not a promise.
• The secret rides after the #Everything past the # in a URL is, by long-standing web design, never transmitted to a web server. That is where the encrypted secret and its key sit — which is how a tool with no server at all can still deliver one.
• The chat log keeps nothing readableWhat remains in WhatsApp, Slack or your sent mail is an opaque string. Even someone scrolling back through the conversation months later finds nothing they can use.
• A passphrase makes a leaked link harmlessTurn it on and the key comes from words only you and the reader know, so an intercepted link is worthless. Say the passphrase on the phone and send the link by text.
• Or skip sending entirelyPro shows the link as a QR code. Hold up your screen, they scan it, and the secret crosses the table without touching a network at all.

Private by design

There is no server, no account, no analytics and no log. We cannot read your secrets, cannot tell whether one was opened, and cannot recover one. That design has an honest cost that deserves stating plainly, because most tools in this category gloss over it: with no server, nothing can actually delete your secret after the first read. What “burn after reading” does here is record in the reader's own browser that the link has been opened and refuse to show it again on that device. Anyone else still holding the link — a forwarded message, a second phone, a backup — can open it. Services like Privnote enforce a real single read by keeping your secret on their server and deleting it; that is a genuine guarantee, paid for by their server holding your secret. We made the opposite trade. If you need a hard one-read guarantee more than you need your secret off other people's machines, use one of those instead, and if you need the link itself to be worthless when intercepted, turn on the passphrase.

Free vs Pro

What's new

v2.0 · 2026-09-25

• Ask for a secret: send a request link and let someone send you a password, PIN or bank details — only your browser can open the reply, with no server involved
• Inbox: your requests and their replies stay encrypted on this device; delete a request and every copy of its replies becomes unreadable for good
• The passphrase is now on by default, with a 🎲 button that suggests a strong one
• Honest wording: “Burn after reading” is now “Hide after it is opened”, and the expiry is now “Hide after” — the page hides the secret, it cannot destroy a copy of the link
• A history of links you sent (name, date and settings only), a Share button next to Copy, and links now open even when the app is already open in a tab